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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk
A decision of far-reaching importance was made by the United States board
of tax appeals in appeal B. B. Todd, Inc., a concern whose business is stated
to be the selling of pianos and victrolas upon the instalment basis. A digest
of the ruling reads as follows:

“The board is without authority to require the commissioner to permit the
filing of returns and the computation of income and profits taxes, under the
provisions of article 42 of regulations 45, since such returns, if filed, would not
‘clearly reflect the income’ of the taxpayer and the method of computing income
provided in that article does not conform to section 200 of the revenue act of 1918."
[Italics ours.—Ed.]
As article 42 of regulations 45 permits taxpayers selling personal property
on the instalment basis to return as taxable income such portion of the profit
“as that proportion of the total cash collections received in the taxable year
from instalment sales . . . which the annual gross profit to be realized on
the total instalment sales made during each year bears to the gross contract
price of all such sales made during that respective year.’’
The commissioner has not yet announced his acquiescence to the foregoing
ruling and his action will be awaited with great trepidation by those taxpayers
who have reported their income upon the instalment basis up to 1921. (The
acts of 1921 and 1924 contain provisions recognizing this basis for returning
taxable income that was not in the act of 1918). This provision permitting
the return of income on the instalment basis was found to be quite a relief to
taxpayers doing a large business on that basis during the high tax but flush
years immediately preceding and following the armistice.
In effect the board has ruled that section 200 of the act of 1918 lays down
a dual basis for reporting taxable income, viz: the cash receipts and disburse
ments basis, and the accrual basis; that as this taxpayer did not keep its books
upon the basis now required by the commissioner of those permitted to return
income upon the instalment basis, the commissioner can not be required to
recognize the instalment method as set forth in section 212 (b) of the act of
1918, wherein it is provided

“ ... if the method employed (of accounting) does not clearly reflect
income, the computation shall be made upon such basis and in such manner
as in the opinion of the commissioner does clearly reflect incone.”

However, the most significant part of this decision is that wherein it is as
serted
“ . . . the method of computing income provided in this article does not
conform to section 200 of the revenue act of 1918.” (The article referred to
being No. 42 of regulations 45.)
As one commentator upon this decision says: “The instalment plan basis is
not authorized by the law.”
If the commissioner has erred in promulgating article 42 of regulations 45
and thereby prescribed a method of computing income contrary to the law,
the question naturally arises as to what other regulations and rulings can be set
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aside upon some such ground? Where is there solid ground for any taxpayer
other than the statute of limitations, and how much reliance can one really
place upon the latter?
Here is a case where hundreds of taxpayers, depending upon what to them
seemed authoritative rulings, have made returns upon a basis prescribed by the
commissioner only to find that as to the acts prior to those of 1921 and 1924,
the commissioner may find justification for changing his mind and, in cases
where the protection of the statute of limitations is not present, reopen the
matter of taxes and assess deficiencies against them; whereas those having the
protection of the said statutes will not be required to pay a tax upon the same
basis as the others mentioned.
SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS

Where net losses were sustained during the years 1922 and 1923, the net
loss for the year 1922 is deductible in computing net income for 1924. If the
net loss sustained during the year 1923 is less than the net income for 1924,
but is not entirely absorbed by the net income of 1924, the unabsorbed por
tion of the net loss sustained during the year 1923 is not deductible in com
puting net income for 1925. (I. T. 2148.)
It may be doubtful whether this ruling will be sustained if the question is
submitted to a higher authority.
Where the corporate stock is so closely held that it can not be valued upon
the basis of sales in the open market, its value will be determined upon the
basis of assets and earnings. (B. T. A. decision 320, docket 1337.)
The value as of March 1, 1913, of stocks whose value was not established in
any free market is a matter of fact to be determined by evidence. (B. T. A.
decision 324, docket 1344.)
Bad debts, charged on the books because too small to justify suit or because
judgment would be worthless, are deductible from gross income. (B. T. A.
decision 325, docket 830.)
Stock of another corporation, when acquired in exchange for stock of the
purchasing corporation, is tangible property under section 325, act of 1918,
notwithstanding the assets of such other corporation consist largely of intan
gibles.
Stock of a subsidiary corporation, whose assets are largely intangible, may
properly be included in invested capital of the parent corporation without the
statutory limitation on intangibles, notwithstanding a subsequent liquidation
and merger of the subsidiary into the parent corporation. (B. T. A. decision
326, docket 784.)
Where the stock of a subsidiary company was acquired with the stock of a
parent company, the amount to be included in the consolidated invested capital
for 1919, with respect to the subsidiary acquired, shall be computed in the same
manner as if the assets had been acquired instead of the stock. (B. T. A.
decision 351, docket 656.)
The board has not jurisdiction over an appeal unless the petition is received
within the statutory period, and a delay caused by mailing it to the commis
sioner deprives the board of jurisdiction. (B. T. A. decision 328, docket 478.)
Claims for wages against the estate of a bankrupt are subordinate to claims
for taxes. (U. S. supreme court decision, Estate of West Coast Rubber Corpora
tion, et al, bankrupt, v. U. S.)
Amounts of net profits credited to individual surplus accounts standing in
the names of the stockholders, which were not and could not have been at the
time actually distributed to the stockholders, were held not to be borrowed
capital of the corporation and were allowed to be included in invested capital.
(Decision of U. S. circuit court of appeals, second district, Eaton, Collector v.
English Merick Co.)
A corporation is not entitled to increase its invested capital upon the sale
of the entire capital stock by its sole stockholder to another at a price much
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greater than the corporation’s asset. (Decision of U. S. circuit court of appeals,
second circuit, Union Petroleum Steamship Company v. Edwards.)

TREASURY RULINGS

(T. D. 3690, April 11, 1925)
Depletion of mines, oil and gas wells; depreciation of improvements.
T. D. 3690
Income and Excess Profits Tax—Revenue Act of 1916—Decision of Court

1. Deduction—Depletion—Lessee—Leasehold.
Under the provisions of the revenue act of 1916, a lessee of mineral lands is
entitled to deduct a reasonable allowance for exhaustion or depletion of his
leasehold or property interest due to the extraction and disposition of the
product of the mine.

The following decision of the supreme court of the United
States in the case of Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co. is published for
the information of internal revenue officers and others concerned.
Supreme Court

of the

United States.

Margaret C. Lynch, Executrix of the Last Will and Testament of E. J. Lynch,
deceased, petitioner, v. Alworth-Stephens Co.
On writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit.
[March 2, 1925.]

Mr. Justice Sutherland delivered the opinion of the court.
The federal income tax return made by respondent (a corporation organ
ized in the United States) for the year 1917 showed the sum of $10,253.21
due the government for income and excess war-profits taxes for that year;
and this amount was paid. Thereafter the commissioner of internal revenue
assessed respondent with an additional tax of $17,128.44, which respondent was
forced to pay and did pay under protest, and to recover which this action was
brought against E. J. Lynch, a collector of internal revenue, to whom the pay
ment had been made. Lynch subsequently died and his executrix was sub
stituted as defendant. The federal district court for the district of Minne
sota, where the action was brought, rendered judgment in favor of respondent
for the amount. (278 Fed. Rep. 959.) The circuit court of appeals affirmed
the judgment (294 Fed. Rep. 190), and the case is here upon certiorari. (264
U. S., 577.)
The facts from which the controversy arose are not in dispute, and, for
present purposes, may be shortly stated. Prior to March 1, 1913, respondent
had leases upon two definitely described tracts of land in Minnesota contain
ing deposits of iron ore, known as the Perkins mine and the Hudson mine.
The leases, unless sooner terminated by the lessee in the manner therein pro
vided, ran for a period of 50 years, and obliged respondent to mine and re
move at least 50,000 tons of iron ore annually from the Perkins and 25,000
tons annually from the Hudson and to pay the lessor, owner of the fee, a
royalty of 30 cents per ton upon each ton of ore extracted. Respondent sub
leased the lands upon terms not necessary to be stated further than that the
sublessee of the Perkins was to pay respondent a royalty of 75 cents per ton
and the sublessee of the Hudson a royalty of 60 cents per ton, or 45 centsand
30 cents, respectively, per ton more than was made payable by respondent to
the lessor owner.
Before March 1, 1913, both tracts of land had been fully explored and the
deposits of ore therein developed to such an extent that the entire amount
of tonnage was known with substantial accuracy, and the properties were
demonstrated to be of great value. On that date it was known that these ore

490

Income-tax Department
bodies would be entirely worked out and the mines exhausted within seven
years; and this in fact happened. The market value of the ore in the mines
during that entire time exceeded 75 cents per ton; and it sufficiently appears
that during such time respondent and its sublessees were in possession of the
lands engaged in mining and removing the ore therefrom. Without repeating
the formula followed in arriving at the result, it is enough to say that the
trial court found that, under the leases, the respondent had a property in
terest in these ore bodies, the fair market value of which, as of March 1,
1913, was 71.9 per cent of the total royalties which would be received under
the subleases, and such royalties constituted the sole source of respondent’s
income. Thereupon, the lower courts held that respondent was entitled to
deduct from its gross income for 1917 a sum equal to 71.9 per cent thereof
for depletion, and that only the balance remaining was subject to income
and excess profits taxes. Such taxes, properly computed, amounted to the
sum returned and originally paid by respondent and no more.
The applicable law is found in sections 2, 10, and 12 (a) of the act of Sep
tember 8, 1916 (ch. 463, 39 Stat., 756, 757-758, 765, 767). Section 10 im
poses a tax of 2 per centum upon the total annual net income received from
all sources by every corporation, etc., organized in the United States. Section
12 (a)
*
provides that such net income shall be ascertained by deducting from
the gross amount of the income, among other things, "a reasonable allowance
for the exhaustion ... of property arising out of its use . . . ; (b) in the case
of mines a reasonable allowance for depletion thereof not to exceed the market
value in the mine of the product thereof which has been mined and sold during
the year for which the return and computation are made, ...” Section 2
contains the following provision (p. 758):
(c) For the purpose of ascertaining the gain derived from the sale or other
disposition of property, real, personal, or mixed, acquired before March 1,1913,
the fair market price or value of such property as of March 1, 1913, shall be the
basis for determining the amount of such gain derived.”
Upon the foregoing facts and under these statutory provisions, the question
presented for consideration is whether the relation of respondent to the mines,
which were the source of its income, was such that it was entitled to deduct
from the gross amount of such income a reasonable amount for exhaustion
or depletion. Upon the part of the petitioner the contention is that the leases
do not convey to the lessee the ore bodies but are contracts of rental conferring
only the right to use and occupy the premises and mine the ore, which, so
long as it remains in the ground, is the property of the fee owner. It is, there
fore, insisted that by the extraction of the ore only the property of the fee
owner is depleted and such owner alone is entitled to an allowance therefor.
On the other hand, respondent contends that under the leases the lessee, as
well as the lessor, owns a valuable property interest in the mines and by the
terms of the statute each is entitled to deduct from gross income a reasonable
allowance for depletion, the lessee for exhaustion of the leasehold interest
and the lessor for exhaustion of the fee interest as lessened by the interest of the
lessee, such deduction to be allowed according to the value of the interest
of each in the property, the entire allowance, however, not to exceed the total
* Sec. 12. (a) In the case of a corporation, joint-stock company or association, or insur
ance company, organized in the United States, such net income shall be ascertained by de
ducting from the gross amount of its income received within the year from all sources—
*****
Second. All losses actually sustained and charged off within the year and not compen
sated by insurance or otherwise, including a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and
tear of property arising out of its use or employment in the business or trade; (a) in the case
of oil and gas wells a reasonable allowance for actual reduction in flow and production to be
ascertained not by the flush flow, but by the settled production or regular flow; (b) in the case
of mines a reasonable allowance for depletion thereof not to exceed the market value in the
mine of the product thereof which has been mined and sold during the year for which the
return and computation are made, such reasonable allowance to be made in the case of both (a)
and (b) under rules and regulations to be prescribed by the secretary of the treasury: Provided,
That when the allowance authorized in (a) and (b) shall equal the capital originally invested,
or in the case of purchase made prior to March 1, 1913, with fair market value as of that date,
no further allowance shall be made; . . .
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market value in the mine of the product thereof mined and sold during the
taxable year.
It is, of course, true that the leases here under review did not convey title
to the unextracted ore deposits (United States v. Biwabik Mining Co., 247
U. S., 116, 123), but it is equally true that such leases, conferring upon the
lessee the exclusive possession of the deposits and the valuable right of remov
ing and reducing the ore to ownership, created a very real and substantial
interest therein. See Hyatt v. Vincennes Bank (113 U. S., 408, 416); Ewert
v. Robinson (289 Fed. Rep., 740, 746-750). And there can be no doubt that
such an interest is property. (Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U. S., 414, 421;
Bryan v. Kennett, 113 U. S., 179, 192.)
The general provision in section 12(a), second, is that the deduction from
gross income shall include a reasonable allowance for the “exhaustion
. . . of property.” There is nothing to suggest that the word “property”
is used in any restricted sense. In the case of mines, a specific kind of prop
erty, the exhaustion is described as depletion, and is limited to an amount
not exceeding the market value in the mine of the product mined and sold
during the year. The interest of respondent under its leases in the mines
being property, its right to deduct a reasonable allowance for exhaustion of
such property, if there be any, during the taxable year results from the plain
terms of the statute, such deduction, since the property is an interest in
mines, to be limited to the amount of the exhaustion of respondent’s interest
caused by the depletion of the mines during the taxable year. We agree with
the circuit court of appeals (294 Fed., 194) that “the plain, clear and reason
able meaning of the statute seems to be that the reasonable allowance for
depletion in case of a mine is to be made to everyone whose property right
and interest therein has been depleted by the extraction and disposition ‘of
the product thereof which has been mined and sold during the year for which
the return and computation are made.’ And the plain, obvious and rational
meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden
sense that nothing but the exigency of a hard case and the ingenuity and
study of an acute and powerful intellect would discover.”
It is said that the depletion allowance applies to the physical exhaustion
of the ore deposits, and since the title thereto is in the lessor, he alone is en
titled to make the deduction. But the fallacy in the syllogism is plain.
The deduction for depletion in the case of mines is a special application of the
general rule of the statute allowing a deduction for exhaustion of property.
While respondent does not own the ore deposits, its right to mine and remove
the ore and reduce it to possession and ownership is property within the
meaning of the general provision. Obviously, as the process goes on, this
property interest of the lessee in the mines is lessened from year to year, as the
owner’s property interest in the same mines is likewise lessened. There is
an exhaustion of property in the one case as in the other; and the extent of it,
with the consequent deduction to be made, in each case is to be arrived at in the
same way, namely, by determining the aggregate amount of the depletion of the
mines in which the several interests inhere, based upon the market value of the
product and allocating that amount in proportion to the interest of each sever
ally considered.
We are referred to Weiss v. Mohawk Mining Co. (264 Fed. Rep., 502), where
the circuit court of appeals for the sixth circuit reached an exactly opposite
conclusion to that announced in the present case by the courts below. The
opinion in that case was apparently made to rest upon the decision of this
court in United States v. Biwabik Mining Co., supra, which, in turn, followed
Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Co. (242 U. S., 503). These cases, however,
arose under the corporation tax law of 1909 (ch. 6, 36 Stat., 11, 112, sec. 38),
imposing a special excise tax with respect to the carrying on or doing business
by a corporation, etc., measured by its net income, in the ascertainment of
which, among other things, there was authorized a deduction of “a reasonable
allowance for depreciation of property.” The Sargent Land Co. case concerned
the owner and lessor of mining property, while the Biwabik Mining Co. case
concerned a lessee of mining property. It was held in both cases, as we hold
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here, that the leases under consideration did not convey title to the ore in
place. Whether the lessees had property interests such as we have determined
here was not considered. Both decisions, expressly in one and implicitly in the
other, turned, primarily, upon the scope of the word “depreciation.” In the
Sargent Land Co. case this appears expressly from the following extract
(pp. 524-525):
“We do not think congress intended to cover the necessary depreciation of a
mine by exhaustion of the ores in determining the income to be assessed under
the statute by including such exhaustion within the allowance made for
depreciation. It would be a strained use of the term depreciation to say that,
where ore is taken from a mine in the operation of the property, depreciation,
as generally understood in business circles, follows. True, the value of the
mine is lessened from the partial exhaustion of the property, and, owing to its
peculiar character, can not be replaced. But in no accurate sense can such
exhaustion of the body of the ore be deemed depreciation. It is equally true
that there seems to be a hardship in taxing such receipts as income without some
deduction, arising from the fact that the mining property is being continually
reduced by the removal of the minerals. But such consideration will not
justify this court in attributing to depreciation a sense which we do not believe
congress intended to give to it in the act of 1909.”
And this view is immediately emphasized by putting in contrast with the
“depreciation” of the 1909 act the “reasonable allowance for the exhaustion
. . . of property” of the income tax provision of the tariff act of 1913 and the
exhaustion and depletion provisions of the act of 1916, heretofore quoted.
“These provisions,” the court concluded (p. 525), “were not in the act of
1909, and, as we have said, we think that congress, in that act, used the term
‘depreciation’ in its ordinary and usual significance. We therefore reach the
conclusion that no allowance can be made of the character contended for as
an item of depreciation.”
The decision in the later case of the Biwabik Mining Co., it is true, rests
upon the predicate that the lessee was not a purchaser of the ore in place,
but that was because the decision of the lower court—that the lease as applied
to the situation there developed, was “in every substantial way pro tanto
a purchase”—presented that question as the one to be met. The lower court
thought that the case of the lessor (Sargent Land Co.) was to be distinguished
from that of the lessee (Biwabik Mining Co.) upon the theory that while the
royalties paid to the former might properly be called income, the receipts of
the latter resulted from the sale of capital assets and were not income. But
this court rejected the assumed distinction as unsound and decided the case
upon that point without referring to the question of deduction on account of
depreciation. Evidently it was taken for granted in the lower court that under
the decision in the Sargent Land Co. case the latter point was no longer open,
and it was passed there, as it was here, without comment. Considering the
Sargent Land Co. and the Biwabik Mining Co. cases together, it is apparent
that in respect of the matter of depreciation under the act of 1909, in the opinion
of this court, lessor and lessee stood upon the same footing, neither being
entitled to an allowance; but it was plainly recognized that if the statutory
allowance had been for exhaustion or depletion, as in the later acts, an entirely
different question might have been presented as to both interests. We find
nothing in either case out of harmony with the conclusion reached by the lower
courts, in respect of the construction and application of the pertinent provisions
of law which are now under review. Affirmed.

(T. D. 3691, April 11, 1925.)
Article 503: Corporations liable to tax.

Income tax—Revenue act of 1918—Decision of supreme court
1. Income Tax—Income From Exports—Constitutionality.
An income tax levied upon net income from the business of exporting goods
from the United States and selling such goods in foreign countries is not a tax
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laid on articles exported from any state in violation of article I, section 9,
clause 5, of the constitution of the United States.

2. Same—Revenue Act of 1918—Constitutionality.
An income tax levied under the revenue act of 1918 upon net income from
the business of exporting goods from the United States and selling them in
foreign countries, even though the act be construed as exempting from such
tax the income of foreign corporations from like sources, does not deprive the
taxpayer of his property without due process of law in violation of the fifth
amendment to the constitution of the United States; nor does such a tax
violate the rule of uniformity.
3. Same—Petition for Rehearing Overruled.
Any difference between the revenue acts of 1918 and 1921, by which foreign
corporations were wholly exempted in one act and only partially exempted in
the other, does not make any difference in the application of the principle
announced in National Paper & Type Co. v. Bowers (266 U. S., 373; T. D.
3677 [Bulletin IV-10, 11]). Foreign corporations constitute a class by them
selves and could be properly so treated by congress.

The appended decision of the supreme court of the United States in the case
of Barclay & Co., Inc., v. William H. Edwards, Collector, is published for the
information of internal-revenue officers and others concerned.
Supreme Court of

the

United States.

No. 547.—October Term, 1924.

Barclay & Co., plaintiff in error, v. William H. Edwards, Collector of Internal
Revenue for the Second District of New York.
In error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District
of New York.

[March 9, 1925.]

Mr. Chief Justice Taft delivered the opinion of the court.
On December 15, 1924, Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of this
court in the case of the National Paper & Type Co. against Frank K. Bowers,
Collector (No. 320 of the October Term, 266 U. S., 373; T. D. 3677). That
case was heard at the same time with this. They were suits to recover taxes
which it was claimed had been illegally collected for the reason that the statutes
under which they had been exacted deprived the taxpayers of their property
without due process of law. The statute attacked in No. 320 was the income
tax of 1921, that in this case was the income tax of 1918.
The plaintiffs in the two cases were corporations of this country engaged in
the business of the purchase and manufacture of personal property within the
United States and the sale thereof without the United States. Their objection
to the taxes both of 1921 and 1918 was that they were subjected to a tax on all
of their net income, including profits made by them in the sale of their goods
abroad, while foreign corporations engaged in the same business of buying and
manufacturing goods in this country and selling them abroad were not taxed
upon their whole net income but were exempted from a tax on all or a part of it.
Another objection to the tax was that the tax in both instances was a tax
on exports. That was disposed of by this court in opinion No. 320 by reference
to the case of Peck & Co. v. Lowe (247 U. S., 165; T. D. 2726).
The court further pointed out that in respect to what was called discrimina
tion in favor of foreign corporations congress might adopt a policy calculated
to serve the best interests of this country in dealing with citizens or subjects
of another country and might properly say as to earnings from business begun
in one country and ending in another that the net income of foreign subjects
or citizens should be left to the taxation of their own government or to that
having jurisdiction of the sales; that the question of taxing foreign corporations
on such income might properly be affected by the consideration that domestic
corporations had the power of the United States to protect their interests and

494

Income-tax Department
redress their wrongs in whatever part of the world their business might take
them, while the foreign corporations must look to the country of their origin
for protection against injury or redress of losses occurring in countries other
than the United States. Having disposed of No. 320 for these reasons in
favor of the government by affirming the judgment below, a short opinion was
delivered by Mr. Justice McKenna in No. 547 (45 Sup. Ct. Rep., 135), in
which he said that the charge of invalidity in that case was on the same grounds
as those set up in No. 320; and that upon authority of the decision in No. 320,
the judgment should be affirmed. A petition for rehearing seeks now to differ
entiate the present case from that considered and decided in No. 320.
The revenue act of 1918 (40 Stat., 1076) provided for a tax of 12 per cent
on the net income in excess of certain credits upon domestic corporations, but
contained this provision in case of foreign corporations, under section 233(b):
“ In the case of a foreign corporation gross income includes only the gross
income from sources within the United States, including the interest on bonds,
notes, or other interest-bearing obligations of residents, corporate or otherwise,
dividends from resident corporations, and including all amounts received (al
though paid under a contract for the sale of goods or otherwise) representing
profits on the manufacture and disposition of goods within the United States.”
(40 Stat., 1077.)
The revenue act of 1921 taxed the net income (meaning the gross income,
less certain deductions) of domestic corporations. (42 Stat., 252, 254.) The
same section, No. 232, provided that “ In the case of a foreign corporation, the
computation should be made in the manner provided in section 217.” The
relevant parts of sections 217 and 233 were as follows:
‘‘Sec. 217. (a) That in the case of a nonresident alien individual or of a
citizen entitled to the benefits of section 262. . . .
“ (e) Items of gross income, expenses, losses and deductions, other than
those specified in subdivisions (a) and (c), shall be allocated or apportioned to
sources within or without the United States under rules and regulations pre
scribed by the commissioner with the approval of the secretary. . . . Gains,
profits and income from (1) transportation or other services rendered partly
within and partly without the United States, or (2) from the sale of personal
property produced (in whole or in part) by the taxpayer within and sold without
the United States, or produced (in whole or in part) by the taxpayer without
and sold within the United States, shall be treated as derived partly from
sources within and partly from sources without the United States. Gains,
profits and income derived from the purchase of personal property within and
its sale without the United States or from the purchase of personal property
without and its sale within the United States, shall be treated as derived
entirely from the country in which sold. . . . (42 Stat., 243, 244, 245.)
“Sec. 233. . . .
“ (b) In the case of a foreign corporation, gross income means only gross
income from sources within the United States, determined (except in case of
insurance companies subject to the tax imposed by section 243 or 246) in the
manner provided in section 217.” (42 Stat., 254.)
Counsel contend in their petition for rehearing that the revenue act of 1921
provided with respect to the manufacture of goods within the United States by
foreign corporations which they sold in foreign countries that the income
derived should be allocated to sources within the United States and imposed a
tax on that part of such income allocated to manufacture, whereas the revenue
act of 1918, under which this case arose, exempted from tax all income of
foreign corporations derived from the manufacture or purchase of goods
within the United States which they sold or disposed of in foreign countries.
But we do not think that that distinction makes any difference in the applica
tion of the principle upon which the judgment in No. 320 was based. What
ever the difference between the acts, whether the foreign corporations were
wholly exempted or only partially exempted, they constituted a class all by
themselves and could be properly so treated by congress because of the consid
erations suggested in the opinion in No. 320. The attack made upon the law of
1921 for discrimination against American corporations in favor of foreign cor
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porations was quite as vigorous in the briefs of counsel for the plaintiffs in
error in No. 320 as in No. 547, and rested on the same argument, and while the
exemption of the net income of foreign corporations from manufacture in the
United States did not exist in the act of 1921, as in the act of 1918, the question
of discrimination in the two cases only differed in extent and did not call
for any real distinction in deciding them. The question where an income is
earned is always a matter of doubt when the business is begun in one country
and ended in another. As pointed out by the plaintiff in error in his brief in
No. 320, much of the business in such foreign trade in addition to the manu
facture is done in the United States in storehouses and docks and in other
ways after the manufacture, but whatever of that might be equitably allocated
as done in the United States is exempted from taxation of foreign corporations
by the act of 1921. Thus exactly the same question presents itself as in No.
320. It is only a difference in degree.
The power of congress in levying taxes is very wide, and where a classifi
cation is made of taxpayers that is reasonable, and not merely arbitrary and
capricious, the fifth amendment can not apply. As this court said, speaking
of the taxing power of congress, in Evans v. Gore (253 U. S., 245, 256):
“It may be applied to every object within its range ‘in such measure as con
gress may determine’; enables that body ‘ to select one calling and omit another,
to tax one class of property and to forbear to tax another ’; and may be applied
in different ways to different objects so long as there is ‘geographical uni
formity’ in the duties, imposts and excises imposed. (McCulloch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat., 316, 431; Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall., 433, 443; Austin v.
The Aidermen, 7 Wall., 694, 699; Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall., 533, 541, 548;
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S., 41, 92, 106; Treat v. White, 181 U. S., 264, 268269; McCray v. United States, 195 U. S., 27, 61; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220
U. S., 107, 158; Billings v. United States, 232 U. S., 261, 282; Brishaber v.
Union Pacific R. R. Co., 240 U. S., 1, 24-26.) ”
The power of congress to make a difference between the tax on foreign cor
porations and that of domestic corporations is not measured by the same rule
as that for determining whether taxes imposed by one state upon the profits
of a manufacturing corporation are an imposition of tax upon a subject matter
not within the jurisdiction of the taxing state. Cases on that subject, like
Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain (254 U. S., 113), have no applica
tion to the question here. Considerations of policy toward foreign countries
may very well justify an exemption of the foreign corporations from taxes
that might legitimately be imposed on them but which congress does not think
it wise to exact. Such considerations justify a different classification of
foreign corporations doing business in the United States, either of manufacture
or purchase, and making profit out of that business in other countries from
that which would apply to its own corporations. The injustice thought to be
worked upon domestic corporations engaged in sales abroad by a different
classification for purposes of taxation of foreign corporations similarly en
gaged is an argument not for the constitutional invalidity of the law before a
court but for its repeal before congress.
The opinion of Mr. Justice McKenna, applying the same principles in this
case to those applied in No. 320, was entirely justified, and the petition for
rehearing is overruled.
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